Bravo Company had a series of engagements with NVA forces in the
vicinity of Landing Zone (LZ) Carol during the period 24 July – 26
August 1968, resulting in nineteen
US
killed in action and many wounded. These are extremely high figures for
an infantry company that had a foxhole strength of approximately 120
troopers, and these casualties also included an officer and
non-commissioned officers.
This account is dedicated to the memory of our fallen buddies and
comrades who were killed in action (KIA) during these firefights:
| |
IN MEMORY OF
 |
BACKGROUND
These Bravo Company firefights were the
beginning of a long and vicious contest between US and NVA forces for
control of the chain of mountains surrounding LZ Carol. The 1st
Cavalry Division established LZ Carol on Hill 927 (YD343194) in July
1968, but it was abandoned at some later date, probably around the time
when the division moved south in October 1968. LZ Carol was reoccupied
in March 1970, this time by the 101st Airborne Division and
they gave it a new name - Fire Support Base (FSB) Ripcord.
LZ Carol/ FSB Ripcord achieved a notorious
reputation as a hilltop that was fiercely contested by NVA forces on a
level equal to the siege of the Marine base at Khe Sanh during
January-April 1968. The reason for this was that the area surrounding LZ
Carol was a huge NVA logistical complex and important staging area for
enemy operations in Hue
and Quang Tri, and the NVA had no intentions of ceding control of this
vital territory to US Army units. As Bravo Company can attest from their
firefights during July-August 1968, the NVA fought fiercely for this
territory and they succeeded in compelling the 101st Abn Div
to abandon FSB Ripcord after a 23 day siege with extremely high friendly
losses in July 1970. During their occupation of FSB Ripcord from 12
March to 23 July 1970, the 101st Abn Div sustained a total of
248 KIAs.
Recent research shows that the 101st
Abn Div losses during the siege of FSB Ripcord, 1-23 July 1970 (75 KIA
and 345 WIA), exceeded the casualties sustained
during the infamous battle of “Hamburger Hill” in 1969, located
22
kilometers south of LZ Carol/FSB Ripcord in the A
Shau Valley. Apparently the 101st Abn Div soldiers who fought
on FSB Ripcord during 1970 dubbed it “Cheeseburger Hill”.
Cheeseburger Hill had the same meaning as Hamburger Hill, the
nickname used by 101st Abn Div soldiers who fought there
because they felt that they were “chewed up like a hamburger”.
KHE SANH &
HUE OVERVIEW MAP
Click on Map, to see a more detailed version.
LZ Carol was located on the northeastern edge
of the A Shau Valley and Bravo Company was no stranger to this region
having participated in the 1st Cavalry Divisions air assault
into the A Shau Valley during April-May 1968. The A Shau Valley was a
crucial part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and served as one of the main
points of entry for the infiltration of NVA troops and supplies into the
Northern Military Region from Laos. LZ
Carol was
18 kilometers east of Laos,
a country that the NVA exploited as a safe haven for moving troops and
supplies into South Vietnam. The chain of
mountains surrounding LZ Carol were used by the NVA as a logistical
supply base for supporting the NVA’s 29th and 803d Regts, 324
B Division, and the Co Pung mountain mass (YD336108) was appropriately
nicknamed “The Warehouse” by US forces. The NVA had a network of trails
from Laos
to their logistic storage areas vicinity of LZ Carol, and these trails
continued east to Hue and north to Quang
Tri. There were indications that animal drawn carts were used on some of
these trails for transporting supplies. The terrain around LZ Carol was
mountainous, very rugged and covered by dense forests in all directions.
The notable lack of suitable landing sites, coupled with effective enemy
ground fire against our helicopters, seriously hindered airmobile
operations in the LZ Carol area during July 1968.
Our battalion (2nd Bn, 8th
Cav Regt) was a 1st Brigade unit and our normal operating
area was to the west, north and east of Quang Tri. However, our
battalion was placed under the operational control of the 2nd
Brigade on/or about 21 July and assigned the mission of establishing a
firebase on Hill 927, named LZ Carol, and conducting search and destroy
operations in the surrounding mountains. The 2nd Bn, 8th
Cav Regt conducted offensive operations in the vicinity of LZ Carol
until they reverted to 1st Brigade control on 26 August 1968.
The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment (3rd
Brigade) took control of LZ Carol on 26 August.
The following information on the 22-26 July operations is
based on the official 2nd Bn, 8th Cav Regt Staff
Journals and accounts from former troopers who served with Bravo Company
during this period. To set the scene, a few words about this particular
operation are needed. Although we spent a year fighting in various
regions of Vietnam, we could still
recognize and appreciate the beauty of much of the countryside. But when
you read the following accounts of combat operations in the mountainous
jungle surrounding LZ Carol, keep in mind this poignant description by
one of our troopers -
the entire area was just
evil!
GOOGLE
SATELLITE PHOTO OF LZ CAROL
Click on Map, to see a more detailed version.
BRAVO COMPANY
ACTIONS 21-26 JULY 1968
21 July:
Based on reports from Bravo Company troopers on
the initial assault helicopters, it is highly likely that the US Air
Force had used a “Daisy Cutter” bomb to clear the trees and jungle
growth on Hill 927. Whenever a Daisy Cutter was used to clear a landing
zone, the end result was always lots of tree stumps, jungle debris and
bomb craters. This bombing strike would be conducted shortly before the
combat assault and the final artillery barrages on the landing zone.
Bravo Company conducted an air assault on Hill
927 on or about 21 July with Blackfoot in the lead helicopters. There
are reports that it was necessary to repel the last few meters from the
Hueys and also the need to rapidly clear the landing zone area of debris
to facilitate the landing of artillery guns and other units. Bravo
troopers report sniper fire and probing attacks shortly after touchdown.
After securing the landing zone, an artillery battery, Charlie Company
and Echo Company were airlifted to LZ Carol. In addition, the 2nd
Bn, 8th Cav Regt established a battalion forward command post
on LZ Carol. Charlie Company was given the mission of securing LZ Carol
and there are unconfirmed reports that the company had several
casualties immediately after arriving on LZ Carol. Bravo Company
conducted search and destroy operations to the north of LZ Carol.
22 July:
Charlie Company continued to secure LZ Carol
and conduct local patrols around the firebase. Alpha and Delta companies
were released from the operational control of the 1st Bn, 5th
Cav Regt on 22 July, and both companies were airlifted to LZ Carol.
Delta Company conducted search and destroy operations to the south of LZ
Carol and their night location was at YD350193. Alpha Company was
airlifted to LZ Carol at 1807 hours and spent the night on the firebase.
One of the 229th lift ships transporting Alpha Company was
hit by enemy fire as it approached the LZ. There were no friendly losses
and the helicopter was extracted on 23 July.
Bravo Company continued to conduct search and
destroy operations to the north of LZ Carol with no enemy contact. Their
night location was at YD 341204, and foxhole strength was 4 officers,
105 enlisted and 7 attached (medics and artillery forward observer
team).
23 July:
Charlie Company continued to secure LZ Carol
and conducted local patrols around the firebase. Alpha Company conducted
search and destroy operations to the west of LZ Carol (YD 338192) with
no significant contacts. Delta Company conducted search and destroy
operations to the east of LZ Carol, engaged 2-3 NVA and captured
assorted military equipment at YD356191.
0935: Bravo Company engaged 2 NVA soldiers
moving on a NW TO SW trail, vicinity of YD339206. Bravo’s log supply
ship reported receiving small arms fire from the same general area.
1745: Bravo Company received small arms fire
with no casualties. Bravo Company night location was at YD337206, and
foxhole strength was 4 officers, 105 enlisted and 7 attached.
24 July:
0810: Bravo Company engaged 3-4 NVA soldiers
vic YD337205, resulting in 1 US WIA.
0820: A large enemy force attacked Bravo’s
perimeter and overran one of Blackfoot’s machine gun positions. The
perimeter was reestablished and friendly artillery fires were called in
on enemy positions. There was a short break in the fighting and then the
enemy resumed the attack with automatic weapons and grenades. Friendly
losses were 8 KIAs and 3 WIAs. In addition, a Vietnamese interpreter was
KIA.
Three attempts were made to evacuate Bravo’s
casualties, but all of these medevac choppers received hits from enemy
automatic weapons and the aircraft commander was forced to cancel these
missions because of mechanical problems. These medevac operations are
described in detail at
http://www.eagerarms.com/medevac.html
. On the first medevac attempt at 0950, the door gunner was shot in the
head, the co-pilot was slightly wounded from shrapnel, and the chopper
engine took some hits but made it back to Camp Evans. On the second
medevac operation at 1225, a Bravo trooper was hoisted up using a jungle
penetrator, but he was shot in the hand during the hoisting operation.
The Crew Chief was wounded by shrapnel and the chopper hydraulic system
was hit forcing another emergency return to Camp Evans.
1505: Medevac made a third attempt to pick-up
Bravo’s wounded troopers. While hovering over Bravo’s position, the
aircraft commander was shot and the chopper took so many hits that it
was forced to make a crash landing because of engine failure. All crew
members were rescued within 30 minutes of the crash.
1645: Bravo received small arms fire from the
south with no casualties. No aerial medevac operations were possible to
evacuate Bravo’s KIAs and WIAs. It is believed that a B-52 or some type
of air strike was conducted in the general area during the night. Bravo
night location was at YD337206, and foxhole strength was 3 officers, 97
enlisted and 5 attached.
IN
MEMORY OF
25 July:
Alpha Company took over security of LZ Carol
and conducted local patrols. Charlie Company conducted search and
destroy operations north of LZ Carol and rendezvoused with Bravo at YD
339201. Delta Company conducted search and destroy operations with
negative contacts (YD 357191).
1300: Bravo received sniper fire, vic. YD
338202, resulting in 1 US KIA.
1520: Bravo received automatic weapons fire,
vic YD 338201, with negative casualties.
1630: Bravo received automatic weapons fire,
vic YD 337202, resulting in 4 US KIAs and 1 US WIA. No aerial medevac
operations were possible to evacuate Bravo’s KIAs and WIAs.
Charlie Company rendezvoused with Bravo in the
late afternoon for the purpose of assisting evacuating Bravo’s KIAs to
LZ Carol. During the difficult link-up with enemy forces all over the
area, both units used their radio call signs for identification
purposes, “Eager Arms” for Bravo and “Lone Armor” for Charlie.
There was one Bravo KIA during the link-up. According to the
recollections of one of Bravo’s troopers, “we were especially vulnerable
since it takes at least 2 or 3 troopers to carry each of our fallen
comrades and most of the wounded required some assistance”. Charlie
Company night location was at YD339201. Bravo Company night location was
at YD338202, and foxhole strength was 3 officers, 92 enlisted and 5
attached.
26 July:
Alpha Company continued to secure LZ Carol and
conducted local patrols. Delta Company conducted search and destroy
operations vic. YD361192. Charlie Company assisted Bravo with evacuating
casualties to LZ Carol.
0750: Bravo received automatic weapons fire
from SE resulting in 1 US KIA.
1615: Medevac requested on 24 July was
completed. All of Bravo’s WIAs from 24-25 July were evacuated. Based on
information from a medic who was one of the WIAs, these helicopter
evacuations took place at the base of Hill 927 and they were lift
missions requiring the use of a rigid litter and jungle penetrator.
1830: Bravo and Charlie Companies arrived at LZ
Carol with all of Bravo’s KIAs (13 US and 1 Arvn interpreter).
Bravo Company night location was at LZ Carol,
and foxhole strength was 3 officers, 80 enlisted and 6 attached.
According to the recollections of a Bravo
Company trooper, there was a critical shortage of food as the last
resupply was on 23 July: “I
specifically remember mixing a concoction of coffee, cocoa,
powdered cream and sugar because that was all we could scrape together
from 4 or 5 guys, but we had water from the sky”. On their arrival at LZ
Carol on 26 July, these troopers were starving and they received packs
of Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) rations. These were freeze-dried
rations and according to one trooper, these LRRP rations tasted “like 4
star cuisine from a New York City restaurant after what we went
through”.
CONCLUSIONS
The above extracts from the official 2nd
Bn, 8th Cav Regt Staff Journals provide specific details on
the key events during 22-26 July, but we are left with many unanswered
questions about the actions of Bravo Company. Nevertheless, there are
sufficient facts available to make some reasonable conclusions
concerning the restrictions imposed by the rugged jungle terrain and,
most importantly, the inability to medevac the large number of
casualties - 13 US KIA, 1 ARVN interpreter KIA and an unknown number of
wounded.
Under normal circumstances our awesome
airmobile assets provided us with the means to rapidly conduct surprise
attacks, reinforce units in contact, block enemy escape routes, extract
units in contact, resupply units with ammunition and food, and to
quickly evacuate all our casualties by specially equipped Huey
helicopters. It is important to emphasize that we could not exploit
these airmobile capabilities in the LZ Carol area of operation because
of the rugged jungle terrain, and the effectiveness of enemy automatic
weapon fire that resulted in the loss or damage to 3 medevac
helicopters, one lift helicopter on LZ Carol and the Bravo supply
helicopter received several hits. The double-canopy trees and steep
mountain slopes meant that there was a critical lack of suitable
helicopter landing sites and the dense jungle canopy also restricted the
effectiveness of our supporting fires – artillery, gunships and tactical
air. These significant restrictions not only reduced our combat
advantage over enemy forces, but they also meant that we were unable to
medevac our casualties and this seriously hindered Bravo’s ability to
conduct offensive operations.
In a nutshell, Bravo Company became hostage to
our casualties in terms of our inability to attack or move to another
location. This trapped situation was the direct result of the casualty
evacuation requirements, whereby at least 3 troopers were needed to
carry each KIA and his equipment. This meant that a minimum of 42
bearers, nearly 50 percent of the company strength, were required to
evacuate the 14 KIAs and some of our seriously wounded troopers also
required assistance. The enemy situation was another important factor
because the surrounding jungle at Bravos’ location was infested with
highly-trained NVA soldiers who were not only thoroughly familiar with
the mountainous jungle trail network, but they were also experts at
exploiting this knowledge for selecting well-positioned ambush sites for
engaging us and our helicopters. Consequently, attempts to move were
severely hampered by the requirement to carry the large number of
casualties, the steepness of the mountainous terrain, the density of the
jungle canopy, and the constant NVA ambushes and attacks added to
Bravos’ casualty count.
Those who observed Bravo Company troopers
entering the perimeter at LZ Carol late in the afternoon of 26 July
vividly remember the haunted look on their faces. Words can never
describe the experiences endured by these courageous troopers, among
others; the utter wretchedness and horrors of close combat for several
consecutive days, seeing their buddies and leaders killed by enemy
automatic rifle fire, being under constant enemy pressure from all sides
for eighty-one hours, having to carry their dead buddies and leaders
through mountainous jungle terrain to LZ Carol, and suffering greatly
from fatigue and hunger.
In addition to honoring our troopers who were
killed in action during the LZ Carol operation, we also wish to pay a
special tribute to all those brave and courageous Bravo Company troopers
who participated in combat operations in this “hellish” area in the
vicinity of LZ Carol during the period 21 July to 26 August 1968. Based
on the evidence documented here, one can now say that being a veteran of
the operations at LZ Carol/FSB Ripcord is a mark of great distinction
among combat infantry veterans, particularly those of the 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 101st Airborne Division.
Evidence of the very special bonds that are
forged among combat soldiers in wartime, together with the esprit de
corps of 1st Cavalry Division infantry companies, is clearly
evident in these comments made in 2011 by a former Bravo Company trooper
who participated in the 23-26 July 1968 firefights:
”There were heroes during those
few days for sure, but it is more about the guys who didn't come back or
were wounded, and the rest of the company pulling together to get the
hell out of there and living to fight another day.”
Acknowledgements:
Many thanks for providing valuable input for
this article on LZ Carol to: Steve Bird, Ben Evans, Pete Genecki, Gene
Hedberg, Art Jacobs, Jim Miles and Mark Thielen.
Many thanks to Jim Beck for the fantastic maps
and memorial photographs.
