2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment 1967-68

In late October, intelligence reports indicated that a large NVA force was preparing to attack US military units and installations at Dak To, located in Kontum Province, and close to the tri-border region where South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia meet. Dak To lies on a flat valley floor adjacent to a river, and is completely surrounded by mountains with waves of ridgelines and peaks that stretch for many miles in all directions. Some of these ridges and peaks vary between 2500 and 4000 feet in height, and the slopes are very steep and covered with double and triple-canopy trees that are from 100 to 200 feet high and up to four feet in diameter. November was the beginning of the monsoon season, and temperatures in the mountains could reach 95 degrees during the day and drop to as low as 55 degrees at night.

An NVA soldier captured during the battle stated that all of October was used to prepare fortified positions on the key ridgelines surrounding Dak To, and carrying munitions and supplies to these positions from Laos. On 2 November, an NVA reconnaissance sergeant surrendered to Allied Forces at Dak To. When interrogated, he provided a detailed and accurate battle plan for the attack on the Dak To – Tan Canh area, which was to be conducted by four infantry regiments and one artillery regiment of the 1^st NVA Division. Several other NVA formations participated in this large-scale operation and the total enemy strength was about 12,000 soldiers. The main NVA objective was to compel the US senior headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) to send reinforcements to Dak To and then to inflict heavy casualties on these units. Documents captured during the battle show that each NVA infantry regiment was assigned the mission of destroying one US battalion. A captured NVA battalion executive officer had a hand written directive in his pocket stating that he would defend his position to the last man. All of this demonstrates the fierce determination of the enemy and for the NVA leadership in Hanoi, this was an important political confrontation designed to send a crystal-clear signal on the vulnerability of US forces and that the NVA had the capability to launch large-scale attacks against American forces and installations.  

MACV responded to this enemy encirclement of Dak To – Tan Canh area by deploying several units to reinforce the US 4^th Infantry Division. These formations were placed under the operational control of the 4^th Infantry Division and included the 173^rd Airborne Brigade and our unit, 1^st Brigade, 1^st Cavalry Division. According to a secret message prepared by MACV Deputy Commander, General Creighton Abrams (date/time 221325Z Nov 67), the 1^st Brigade units arrived at Dak To as follows: 1^st Battalion, 8^th Cavalry arrived on 10 November; 1^st Battalion, 12^th Cavalry on 11 November; 1^st Brigade Headquarters and our battalion, 2^nd Battalion, 8^th Cavalry on 14 November.  

The fighting had started on 4 November when US 4^th Infantry Division units attacked to secure the ridges to the south of Dak To. Three days later, 173^rd Airborne Brigade units pushed west and then southwest, while South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units pushed north and east. All of these friendly units met stiff resistance from sizeable enemy forces occupying fortified positions on the tops of the peaks and ridges, which confirmed the accuracy of the detailed battle plan obtained from the NVA deserter. In conjunction with these ground attacks, the US initiated a massive bombardment of enemy positions employing all available means. The extent of this massive bombardment is evident from the munitions expended during the Battle of Dak To: 257 B-52 strikes, 2,096 tactical air sorties and a total of 151,000 artillery rounds. It is hard to imagine how anyone could survive such a  bombing inferno, however, during the course of the battle we discovered that some of the NVA fortified positions consisted of three concentric trenches around the top of a mountain and they had dug a series of holes deep into the mountain which they used as bomb shelters.

There were two phases to the Battle of Dak To; the first phase was between 4-12 November, and the second and most violent phase was from 17-22 November. According to General Abrahm’s message, our battalion arrived in the area on 14 November, however, the 4^th Infantry Division Combat After Action Report states that our Battalion arrived on 18 November (other evidence supports our deployment on 14 November). The latter report went on to state that our battalion was deployed “into the hills east of TAN CANH and encountered strong enemy defences. The battalion operated in the area six days, again blasting the enemy out”.
 

LANDING ZONE ON ARRIVAL AT DAK TO

EXTRACTION OF BRAVO COMPANY 17-18 NOV (LOOKING TOWARDS SPECIAL FORCES CAMP)

Bravo Company was also engaged in a fierce firefight at Hill 1034 on 19 November. On 14 November, the companies of 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, air assaulted into several locations east and southeast of Dak To – Tan Canh/Kon Hojao, with the mission of destroying enemy forces who were preparing to attack our military installations at Dak To 1 and interdict military traffic on Highway QL14, our main logistical supply route between Kontum and Dak To. Bravo Company had been conducting search and destroy operations east of Highway QL14 since our arrival on 14 November.

 

For another Dak To map, see MAPS

During the afternoon of 19 November, Bravo Company started moving from vicinity of coordinates 098214 towards Hill 1034, located at coordinates 109223. Bravo Company was not aware of any intelligence indicating that enemy forces had established extensive fortifications on Hill 1034. For their defense of Hill 1034 and to survive massive bombardments by US artillery and air-strikes, enemy forces had established a horseshoe defense consisting of an elaborate bunker system with connecting tunnels and the whole complex was skillfully camouflaged. Immediately prior to the beginning of this firefight, the lead elements of Blackfoot Platoon had reached the southern tip of Hill 1034 and had started occupying hasty defense positions, while the remainder of Bravo Company continued to close on Hill 1034. It is highly likely that Blackfoot approached Hill 1034 from one direction, while Cheyenne was the lead platoon for the remainder of Bravo Company who approached Hill 1034 from another direction. The command group with Captain Decker and his radio operator, SP4 Fowler, was located with Cheyenne. This was the situation when Bravo came under intense and accurate fire from enemy forces occupying fortified positions on Hill 1034. It all started abruptly when enemy forces engaged Blackfoot from well-camouflaged fighting positions and our first casualty was Lieutenant Rodreick. In the course of a very short period, Bravo Company sustained 10 casualties, representing 9% of our field strength. Among those killed in action was Captain David Decker, Commanding Officer of Bravo Company; Specialist William Fowler, Captain Decker’s radio operator; and Lieutenant Ronald Rodreick, Blackfoot Platoon Leader. Specialist Thomas Olearnick, who was the pointman for Cheyenne on the approach to Hill 1034, was listed as missing in action but his status was later changed to “died while missing”. Based on a letter written home by one of our troopers, Bravo Company had a total of six troopers who were wounded during this action and medevaced by special helicopters. Aztec Platoon was in a position to provide covering fire while Blackfoot and Cheyenne withdrew from the top of Hill 1034 with our casualties.

Instead of requesting an artillery fire mission, our artillery Forward Observer requested close air support on enemy positions on Hill 1034. It is possible that the reason he selected close air support was the double and triple-canopy trees in the target area. The first fighter-bomber pass was too high and Bravo troopers had shrapnel "whizzing all around them". The second pass was right on target but the fighter bomber was hit by ground fire from Hill 1034 as the pilot pulled out of his dive. The tail of the plane was either blown off or caught on fire, and it is unknown whether the pilot succeeded in ejecting or landing his crippled aircraft safely. The assault on Hill 1034 was suspended while we evacuated all of our casualties and it was also necessary to reorganize because the only officer alive in Bravo Company on the afternoon of 19
November was the Artillery Forward Observer.

Early in the morning of 20 November, Captain Peter O’Sullivan assumed command of Bravo Company and landed at the company location in the vicinity of coordinates 098214, with three replacement platoon leaders; Lt. Thomas Beach, Lt. Gus Pappas and Lt. Charles Ready. On the same date, Lt. Thomas De Young was transferred from Charlie to Bravo Company to provide Bravo Company with a combat experienced platoon leader. Lt Bill Berry, a former platoon leader (Aztec?), had become the Company Executive Officer on 16 November. Another former platoon leader
(Cheyenne?) of Bravo Company, Lt. Alfred Lehman was assigned to our Battalion Headquarters Company with an effective date of 21 November. A few hours later, Bravo Company completed the assault of Hill 1034. We spent most of the evening and the following day clearing the extensive enemy bunker complex surrounding Hill 1034, and collecting captured NVA weapons and a large supply of artillery and mortar ammunition, some of which had markings showing that they were manufactured in Russia.
According to information recorded in a letter home, one of the enemy units occupying Hill 1034 was an NVA mortar unit with an identification number of 338. This information was obtained from enemy documents found in the bunkers. Another dangerous situation confronting us was the presence of numerous unexploded cluster bombs that were scattered all over Hill 1034 and an Explosive Ordinance Team spent many hours blowing them up.

We believe the following photograph shows members of Bravo Company on Hill 1034 shortly after they occupied it on 20 November 1967.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (HILL 1034?) Thanks to Ralph Mercado

The following photograph was taken of shortly after we occupied Hill 1034 on 20 November 1967, and these troopers portray the anguish and sorrow that affected all of the members of Bravo Company.

	BRAVO COMPANY ON HILL 1034, DAK TO, 20 NOVEMBER 1967 Captain O'Sullivan and 1st SGT Rodriguez	AFTER THE BATTLE FOR HILL 1034, DAK TO, 20 NOVEMBER 1967 Thanks to Sam Walker. Cheyenne - Ricky Day shirtless (?), Byron Shaw with canteen (?).
	CAPTURED AMMUNITION ON HILL 1034, DAK TO, 21 NOVEMBER 1967 Thanks to Clifford Wright.	LOOKING TOWARDS DAK TO FROM HILL 1034 Thanks to Tom De Young
	CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ON HILL 1034 Thanks to Tom De Young	SCOUT DOG ON HILL 1034 Thanks to Tom De Young

The difficulties of conducting combat assaults in the hills surrounding Dak To with double and triple-canopy trees is clearly evident from this photograph.

	COMBAT ASSAULT AT DAK TO DURING NOVEMBER 1967
	NIGHT DEFENSE POSITION Thanks to Ralph Mercado

By nightfall on 22 November, most of the enemy forces had been withdrawn from the Dak To-Tan Canh area. NVA casualties were between 1200-1455 killed in action and it is likely that the figure for NVA wounded in action would be somewhere around 3000. Provoked by these high casualties, a NVA officer called Dak To a “useless and bloody battle”.
US casualties during the Battle of Dak To were 289 killed in action, 985 wounded and 16 missing in action. Forty helicopters and two C-130 Hercules were destroyed by enemy fire. Because of the steep slopes and triple-canopy trees, there was a serious lack of suitable sites for landing helicopters and this meant that most troop movements had to be conducted on foot. There is no doubt that the scarcity of suitable landing sites made it very difficult to conduct airmobile operations in the Dak To area, and this greatly reduced not only our combat effectiveness but also our combat advantage over our opponents. In fact, there are numerous cases where the Battle of Dak To was a traditional “one on one” infantry contest and where we assaulted hills just like the US infantry did during the Korean War. Most military experts would agree that the battles of Dak To in November and Tam Quan in December were preliminary battles to the Tet Offensive in January 1968.

Thanksgiving at Dak To.

On Thanksgiving Day, 23 November, we received the news that the battle of Dak To was over and the enemy had probably returned to their sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. Bravo Company was on another hilltop in the Dak To area and late in the afternoon, choppers arrived with our Thanksgiving dinner, consisting of turkey with all the trimmings.
Although we enjoyed our meal, there was a noticeable sadness among the troops as if they were silently thinking of their friends and colleagues who were not present.

Bravo Company departed Dak To for LZ English on a C-130 Hercules on 25 November, and conducted a combat assault on a hill close to the Bong Son Plain during the late afternoon.

NOTES:
1. Some of the details of what took place on Hill 1034 on 19 November is based on information received from Jimmie Hentkowski and Clifford Wright during April 2008. Jimmie Hentkowski sent a letter home on 2 December 1967, where he recorded the number of the hill of the 19 November action (Hill 1034), details on the number of Bravo Company casualties and the enemy unit (338 NVA mortar unit).

2. Clifford Wright also recalls that for some unknown reason, we taped over the 1st Cav Div patch on our uniforms - the same policy applied for 1st Cav Div emblems on our helicopters, during the period that we operated in the Dak To area!

3. The placenamesTan Canh and Kon Hojao are both used for this town. Kon
Hojao appears to be the placename used today.